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ABSTRACT
Various theorists have postulated that consequences 
may play an important role in attitude change. Previous 
studies involving attitude change and consequences have 
generally used a dissonance generated counter-attitudinal 
paradigm. However, in the self-attribution interpretations 
of attitude change, the influence of consequences has not 
been thoroughly investigated. Therefore, one of the 
purposes of the present study was to delineate the effect 
two types of feedback have in a situation amendable to 
a self-attribution interpretation of attitude change.
Another purpose of the study was to investigate how 
an individual's perception of various elements in a 
situation change as differing consequences occur.
Also, an attempt was made to delineate what under­
lying attitude change processes might be occurring when 
an individual hears that he has convinced an audience.
Based on a role theory interpretation of attitude change, 
that feedback of other's perception of one's attitude 
is the primary process which takes place in attitude 
change, it was proposed that an individual utilizes 
feedback from an audience in order to infer what his 
attitudes are.
In order to test these notions, 99 subjects were 
induced to give speeches about an obscure commercial 
product. Subjects were given a choice to participate
v
and were also given a choice about speaking in favor of 
the product, A 3 x 3 factorial design was conducted 
involving the independent manipulation of two types of 
feedback which the speaker received.
After giving the speech, the speaker received feed­
back as to a) whether the audience was convinced or not 
convinced that the product was valuable, or received no 
information regarding the convince factor, and b) whether 
the audience felt that what the speaker said represented 
his true attitude, or was not his true attitude, or the 
speaker received no feedback as to the audience's per­
ception of his true attitude.
The results indicated that feedback that the audience 
was not convinced about the worth of the product was most 
influential when subjects were asked their attitudes about 
the product. These findings were not supportive of the 
role theory notion that attitude feedback from others is 
the primary information which determines an individual's 
attitude.
However, in relation to questions concerning subject's 
perception of task related behavior it was found that 
generally, positive feedback and attitudinal feedback 
were most influential. Speakers indicated the most 
attitude change when they received positive feedback 
about the audience’s perception of the speaker's attitude.
These results seemed to indicate that negative 
consequences are more influential when a series of positive 
behavioral cues are present, and positive consequences 
are more influential when a series of negative behavioral 
cues are present. Also, the type of feedback which was 
utilized by the individual seemed to be related to type 
of attribution he was asked to make.
v i i
INTRODUCTION
The role of attitudes has consistently been an impor­
tant area of investigation in social psychology. Even 
though various new areas of emphasis continue to divert 
the attention of theorists, a substantial amount of time 
and effort is continuously expended in the attempt to 
establish and understand the nature of attitudes and 
attitude change. Through these efforts, it has become 
well established that there are a multitude of factors 
which can influence the formation of, or the change of, 
a person's attitude.
One important aspect of attitude change which has 
recently received considerable attention is how attitudes 
are influenced by consequences. When a person states an 
attitude, or performs a behavior, he is very likely to 
receive feedback from his environment as to the effect 
his statements or actions have on other people within 
the environment. Obviously, there are multifarious 
factors which act and interact in numerous ways so that 
there is no easy answer to the questions what effect 
does the consequences of an individual's behavior have 
on the modification of his attitudes?
In order to elucidate the effect consequences have 
on attitude change a research paradigm was developed in
1
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which a common situation was used in order to investigate 
the effects of consequences. A situation was established 
where a person made a statement and then found out what 
other people were syaing about his statement.
However, there are several different ways to concep­
tualize this type of situation. Two of the most important 
approaches will be reviewed in order to elucidate the 
important variables emphasized by these theories and to 
explain why certain approaches were taken in the present 
study.
Of the numerous ways of conceptualizing the effects 
of consequences, the theory of congitive dissonance has 
been the most fertile in delineating the role of conse­
quences in attitude-discrepant paradigms. The attitude- 
discrepant paradigm refers to a situation where a person 
is induced to behave in a manner that is inconsistent or 
dissonant with his beliefs or attitudes. This situation 
theoretically leads to a state of dissonance and subse­
quently to a change in attitude. The induction usually 
takes place as a result of either promised reward for 
complying or threatened punishment for non-compliance.
Dissonance is thought to be a negative state of 
psychological tension aroused by holding two inconsistent 
cognitions and is reduced by changing cognitions which the 
individual holds (Festinger, 1957)* For example, dissonance 
aroused by choosing to perform a counter-attitudinal act 
may be reduced by changing the relevant attitude so that
3
act and attitude are consistent (Festinger and Carlsmith, 
1959).
Investigators have recently proposed that major 
extensions of dissonance theory should he made based on 
findings involving counter-attitudinal behavior and con­
sequences. Research involving consequences and attitude 
change has indicated that a person8s perception of the 
consequences of his action plays a major part in deter­
mining if attitude change will take place. Dissonance 
theorists have attempted to determine what specific 
factors influence attitude change when an individual is 
induced to perform a counter-attitudinal behavior which 
has possible aversive consequences.
Of the numerous studies conducted within the attitude- 
discrepant paradigm, several pertinent factors seem to 
play a major part in producing attitude change. First 
of all, if an individual makes a counter-attitudinal 
statement, he is likely to experience the most attitude 
change is he knows that the audience is uncommitted on 
the issue (Nels, Helmreich, and Aronson, 1969). Another 
important factor is whether or not counter-attitudinal 
advocacy results in undesirable consequences when an 
individual perceives that aversive consequences will 
take place as a result of his actions. If he perceives 
that aversive consequences will be the result, then he 
will change his attitude (Cooper and Worchel, 1970). 
Aversive consequences have generally been defined as
4
consequences which block one’s own self-interest or serve 
to bring about a situation that one would rather not have 
occur (Cooper and Worchel, 1970? Cooper and Goethals,
197^5 Hoyt, Henley and Collins, 1972).
Responsibility for one's action has also been shown 
to be an important factor. Cooper (1971) tested the pro­
position that an individual will not change his attitude 
unless he freely decides to become involved in a poten­
tially discrepant situation and that the possible conse­
quences of that decision are known to him prior to his 
decision. He found that when subjects did not perceive 
responsibility, they did not experience attitude change, 
and personal responsibility was shown to be a function 
of both volition and foreseeability. Similar findings 
have been reported by Hoyt, Henley and Collins (1972).
Other studies (Cooper and Goethals, 197^1 Daniels 
and Prestholdt, 1975? Sheras, Cooper and Zanna, 1973) 
have demonstrated that for attitude change to take place, 
the expectation of negative consequences has to be present. 
For example, Cooper and Goethals (197^) found that when 
aversive consequences were eliminated, attitude change 
did not occur in the group that knew of the possibility 
that their speech might not be used, but did occur in 
the group that expected that their behavior would defi­
nitely lead to aversive consequences. These results 
indicate that when an individual cannot foresee the
5
elimination of an aversive consequence, the individual’s 
committment to the behavior seems to be sufficient to 
produce attitude change.
The research conducted within a dissonance framework 
has illustrated the importance of consequences in influenc­
ing attitude change and has demonstrated that three impor­
tant factors need to be present for attitude change to 
take place. The first factor is aversive consequences? 
that is an individual must feel that the consequences 
which occur produce a situation which he would rather not 
have occur. Secondly, choice must be present; that is, 
an individual must perceive that he has personal respon­
sibility for his actions. Third, foreseeability must 
be present as an individual must be aware at the time of 
commitment that his behavior may result in possible 
aversive consequences.
Prom a dissonance standpoint, it is evident that 
consequences play an important role in producing attitude 
change. It should be noted, however, that the conditions 
and factors investigated have been limited. All of these 
studies have used a counter-attitudinal paradigm. It 
would seem that in real life attitude change can take 
place in many other situations besides where a person 
chooses to make a counter-attitudinal statement and 
aversive consequences occur. Also, the studies involving 
the manipulation of aversive consequences have only 
been concerned with whether or not an audience or
6
confederate is or is not convinced, whether the conse­
quences have high or low desirableness. Also, experi­
menters have only attempted to evaluate the subject’s 
attitude towards a single experimentally prescribed topic. 
Given these limiting factors it would seem imperative 
that researchers consider other approaches besides that 
of dissonance theory.
Attribution theory is another theoretical concep­
tualization which can be used to interpret a situation 
where a speaker’s attitudes are influenced by consequences. 
The attribution approach towards attitude change has 
become more prominent in recent years and is often 
considered to be an alternative viewpoint to dissonance 
theory. Much of the relevant research concerning the 
attribution of attitudes has been conducted within the 
framework of self-attribution or self-perception theory.
In contrast to dissonance theory, Bern (1965) and
Kelley (1967) have proposed that there is no need to
postulate internal states such as dissonance. A person
determines his attitude on the basis of his own behavior
and the stimulus context in which it occurs, much as an
observer would. Bern (1972) and Kelley (1967) have
postulated that a person applies the same attribution
rules to self as he would to others. With regard to
attitude, the self-attribution rule is as follows:
"What would my (this man's) attitude be if I am (he is)
willing to behave in this fashion in this situation,"
(Bern, 1972 p. 7).
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The most important attributional approach to attitude 
change has been developed by Bern (1965. 1967. 1972).
Bern has developed a behavioristic interpretation of the 
attitude-discrepant paradigm and has proposed this approach 
as an alternative to dissonance theory. Bern has proposed 
an information processing model which explains attitude 
change by denying any internal motivational interpre­
tations of attitude change. Bern states that we often 
survey our behavior toward an entity and then infer that 
our attitudes toward the entity are consistent with our 
behavior toward it.
Two main postulates have been set forth by Bern 
(1972) which constitute the heart of self-perception 
theory. First, individuals come to know their own 
attitudes, emotions, and other internal states partially 
by inferring them from observations of their own overt 
behavior and/or the circumstances in which this behavior 
occurs. Secondly, to the extent the internal cues are 
weak, ambiguous, or uninterpretable, the individual is 
functionally in the same position as an outside observer, 
an observer who must necessarily rely upon those same 
external cues to infer the individual’s inner states.
What these propositions imply is that attitudes are 
based on one’s observation of his own behavior and from 
the observation of the controlling variables perceived 
to be related to his behavior. To repeat a frequently 
given example, if a person eats brown bread, without
8
inducements then he would say to himself, 'I ate the dread 
and no one told me to, I received no reward, therefore 
I must like the bread,5 However if his mother had forced 
him to, or he had been given a reward, then he would say,
’I ate the bread because my mother wanted me to eat the 
bread, or because I got money for my behavior,’ Therefore, 
in the latter case, the individual would see his behavior 
as being caused by external inducements and would not 
infer that he ate the bread because he liked it.
Bern (1965s 1967) originally proposed self-perception 
theory as an alternative to dissonance theory. In demon­
strating the viability of self-perception, Bern used a 
technique which has been referred to as an interpersonal 
simulation. An interpersonal simulation is when an 
observer is either given a description of one of the 
conditions of a dissonance experiment or is actually 
permitted to observe one of these conditions and then 
is asked to estimate the subject’s attitude. Unfortu­
nately, this approach has demonstrated various empirical 
and epistemological deficiencies which weaken the validity 
of using interpersonal simulations.
After numerous studies researchers arrived at the 
conclusion that self-perception theory would not be 
proved or disproved using the interpersonal simulation 
paradigm. It was evident that paradigms had to be 
developed which would attempt to establish self-percep­
tion as a theory without casting it as an alternative
9
to dissonance theory. In other words, while previous 
research concerning self-perception has been conducted 
in an attempt to prove or disprove dissonance theory, 
little has been done to establish self-perception as an 
independently viable theory which can explain various 
aspects of attitude change.
In the self-perception research which has been 
conducted, it appears that there are several important 
factors which influence attitude change. Bern (1965«
1966) has demonstrated that environmental variables 
affect attitudes. In these experiments he demonstrated 
that a person’s behavior and his subsequent attitude 
could be influenced by environmental cues present in 
a situation in which behavior occurs.
Other variables have also been established which seem 
to be pertinent to a self-perception interpretation of 
attitude change. The first of these is perceived cause. 
Attitudes formed as a result of behavior seem to be more 
pronounced when an individual perceives his behavior 
to be self-caused, Bandler, Maradas, and Bern (1968) 
demonstrated that subjects rated shocks as being more 
painful when they could (and did) escape shocks, than 
in a condition where they were informed that they should 
not escape, Davidson and Valins (1966) also found that 
when changes are attributed to one’s own self rather 
than to drugs, behavior changes that occur are most likely 
to be maintained. Corah and Boffa (1970) conducted an
10
additional study which illustrated the importance of 
choice in determining whether or not an individual views 
his behavior as being self-caused. Essentially this 
study was a replication of the Bandler, Maradas, and 
Bern (1968) study with modifications made to determine 
the effects of choice. They found that in regard to 
avoiding an aversive stimuli, a procedure which gives 
the subject the choice of avoiding or not avoiding the 
stimuli is equivalent to giving him perceived control 
over the potential threat.
These studies indicate that an important factor in 
determining attitude change is environmental information 
about the cause of behavior. If an individual perceives 
his behavior as being self-caused, then he is likely 
to use this behavior to infer what his attitudes are.
But when he perceives his behavior as being controlled 
by external forces, then it is unlikely that his behavior 
will influence his attitudes.
Another factor which has been manipulated has been 
the attribution of meaning of behavior. In these studies 
some aspect of the environmental input has been manipu­
lated and the resulting change in attitude then measured. 
Of the several studies which have been conducted, it has 
been shown that subjects will use cues in the environment 
in order to form their attitudes towards a prescribed 
topic. Salancik (197^0 manipulated cognitive sets by 
varying instructions on a questionnaire and found that
11
different prepositional phrases provided differing cues 
as to how an individual would make a judgment. Kiesler, 
Nisbett and Zanna (19&9) used a pro-attitudinal design 
where subjects argued in favor of already existing 
positive attitudes. They manipulated reasons for doing 
an experiment which were conveyed by a confederate who 
was participating in the same study. When the confederate 
stated that he wanted to do the experiment because he 
really believed in the topic, they found more attitude 
change than when the confederate stated that the experi­
ment was good because it would advance the cause of 
science. These studies indicate that factors which are 
in the environment are used as cues by individuals in 
order to determine what his attitude should be. If 
he perceives he has choice, and that what he is doing 
in the experiment is important, something that he believes 
in, then it is likely that attitude change will take 
place.
Another factor which has been manipulated has been 
the intensity of behavior. How intense or effortful 
an individual perceives his behavior to be is a factor 
which he takes into consideration when he evaluates 
his attitude. Zanna (1973) conducted a study where he 
manipulated the subject's perceived motivation towards 
a task and initial attitudes towards the experimenter.
He found that when perceived motivation was consistent 
with initial attitudes towards the experimenter, subjects
appeared to explain their performance by inferring that 
they held attitudes toward the experimenter which were 
consistent with their performance. When perceived moti­
vation was inconsistent with initial attitudes toward the 
experimenter, subjects tended to account for their per­
formance by attributing to themselves an attitude toward 
the task more consistent with their performance. Thus, 
attitudes towards a task were acquired by one's perspective 
of how he did on a task and were also influenced by his 
initial attitudes. This indicates that people use their 
perception of how they did on a task to infer what their 
attitude towards the task should be.
Finally, a study which involved a form of consequences 
was conducted by Taylor (1975)- Taylor created a situation 
where subjects either expected or did not expect to meet 
an individual who they evaluated. Taylor found that when 
future consequences were anticipated, subjects engaged 
in a critical time consuming reevaluation of their 
attitudes, which resulted in a more critical and broader 
information search, i.e. a wider perusal of environmental 
cues. The results indicated that when one's future 
behavior is influenced by the expression of an attitude, 
that attitude seems to be weighted more carefully and more 
information is used in deciding what one believes. This 
suggests that self-perception must take into account 
the conditions under which a person infers and subse­
quently acts on his attitude. It appears that
1-J
consequences may play an important role in the self­
perception of attitudes.
Kelley (1967) has suggested that consequences may 
play a major role in an attribution approach to attitude 
change. He has theorized that if an individual assumes 
responsibility for negative consequences, then that indi­
vidual would make an internal attribution of causality. 
However, if the individual has no choice, and negative 
consequences occur, then he is likely to make an external 
attribution for the consequences. However, these concep­
tualizations about consequences interacting with choice 
have not been thoroughly investigated within a self­
perception framework.
To summarize the two approaches which have been 
reviewed, the dissonance theory orientation has indicated 
that several important factors must be present for attitude 
change to take place. One, the act must be counter- 
attitudinal, which produces dissonance, which causes 
a person to change his attitudes in order to reduce 
the dissonance. Secondly, a perception of choice must 
be present. Third, aversive consequences must also be 
the result of one's action if attitude change is to take 
place. The aversive consequences must be a situation 
which one would rather not have happen.
Self-perception theorists also emphasize the impor­
tance of choice. If a behavior is to influence his 
attitudes, an individual must feel that he had a choice
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to perform the behavior. However, contrary to dissonance 
theory, self-perception theorists feel that a behavioral 
act does not need to be counter-attitudinal in order to 
produce attitude change. Self-perception theorists 
have also been able to demonstrate that attitude change 
is influenced by environmental cues present in a situation, 
and by self-perceptions, such as intensity of behavior.
However, there are many areas of self-perception 
which have not been investigated. In the majority of 
studies which have been conducted, the designs have dealt 
primarily with the manipulation of the perceived cause 
of behavior (Bandler, Maradas and Bern, 1968? Corah and 
Boffa, 1970? Davidson and Valins, 1969) or has involved 
the manipulation of the perceived intensity or meaning 
of behavior (Kiesler, Nisbett and Zanna, 1969s Salancik, 
197^ s and Zanna, 1973)• But, other than the study by 
Taylor (1975) there has been a lack of studies designed 
to determine how consequences of behavior influence the 
self-attribution of attitudes. Also, most of the pro­
cedures have failed to measure anything but the attitude 
or feeling about the topic or issue about which the 
subject made a presentation. It is important that 
measures be taken of more elements other than an indi­
vidual’s attitude towards a single topic. A manipulation 
of a variable may not only influence the subject’s 
attitude about the topic, but may also produce changes in 
a subject's perception of other elements which are present
within the situation. For instancep the manipulation of 
perceived consequences might affect the subject's percep­
tion of the cause and intensity of his own behavior and 
influence his perception of the intensity of his own 
feelings about the topic. Walster (1966), while looking 
at attributions which observers make, found that the 
manipulation of perceived consequences of behavior results 
in differential attributions of the causes of the behavior. 
It is likely that consequences in a self-attribution 
approach may have similar effects that should be inves­
tigated.
One of the purposes of the present research was to 
create a situation amendable to a self-perception inter­
pretation in order to investigate further how an indivi­
dual’s perception of various elements in a situation 
change as differing consequences occur. Of course,, the 
major purpose of the investigation was to delineate the 
effect consequences have in influencing attitude change 
in a self-perception p’aradigm. Therefore , a situation 
was created where a speaker gave a talk, which was not 
counter-attitudinal, about a specific topic and then 
received feedback from an audience concerning their 
perception of the talk. Measurements were made to 
determine the effect of the feedback on the speaker's 
attitude towards the topic which he advocated and to 
determine the effect feedback had on the speaker's 
perception of other elements related to the situation.
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In such a situation various factors can influence a 
speaker's attitude. Basically, previous research involving 
counter-attitudinal situations (Scott, 1957b 1959b and 
Nels et al. 1969) have used a procedure which informed 
the speaker of whether or not the audience was convinced, 
that is, whether or not the audience's attitudes were 
influenced by the talk, and then observed what effect 
this feedback had on the speaker's attitude towards 
the topic which he advocated. Results have generally 
indicated that a speaker's attitude changes towards the 
position he advocates when he hears that he has convinced 
an audience.
However, an unanswered question is exactly what does 
this type of feedback convey to the speaker? Why does 
this type of feedback produce attitude change? One 
possible explanation is that when a person hears this 
feedback, he makes certain assumptions about what his 
own attitude should be, based on this feedback, i.e. 
the feedback provides information about his own attitude.
If this process is taking place then it is very similar 
to various conceptualizations which role theorists have 
developed.
Role theory in many ways can be considered to be 
a forerunner of self-perception theory (Shaver, 1975)«
Role theorists have emphasized that a person uses others 
in his environment to establish his attitude. A concept 
relevant to the present investigation which has been
a./
elucidated and expanded by role theorists is the concept 
of the "looking glass self". Basically, this concept 
implies that an individual5s self-image develops out of 
his perceptions of the reactions of others to him. In 
effect, one's self-image is a mirror of the reactions 
of other people.
Cooley (19^2) was one of the original advocates of 
the concept and since then various theorists have modified 
and expanded the concept. The concept presently implies 
that an individual, in developing or changing his attitudes, 
uses the external evaluations of other people in order 
to form his own values and attitudes (Biddle and Thomas, 
1966), In contrast to self-perception theorists, role 
theorists have emphasized that these external evaluations 
made by others are the primary process an individual 
uses to develop his attitudes (Turner, 1966). Unfortu­
nately, role theorists have not empirically investigated 
important factors and processes involved in this "looking 
glass self" conceptualization. Also, although self- 
perception theorists have conducted numerous empirical 
studies, they have not investigated how individuals 
interpret feedback from others in the environment in order 
to establish their attitudes. Therefore, while feedback 
from others has long been emphasized by role theorists 
as an important component of attitude change, self­
perception theorists have not examined the implications 
of these conceptualizations. It is entirely possible
18
that self-perception theorists have lost sight of important 
variables which cause attitude change. An additional 
purpose of the present research was to examine several 
types of feedback in order to determine how they influence 
attitude change.
In a situation where an individual receives feedback 
about his attitudinal statements, it is important to under­
stand the speaker's interpretation of this feedback. In 
other words, what type of information is conveyed which 
causes a speaker to change his attitude? Role theorists 
state that a person infers his attitude based on infor­
mation of the audiences perception of his attitude.
If this interpretation is correct, then when a speaker 
finds that what he said convinced an audience, he infers 
that the audience perceives what he said as being repre­
sentative of his real attitude. The speaker, in effect, 
makes an assumption that could be stated ass "I convinced 
the audience. Since I convinced the audience, they must 
have perceived me as being sincere and that I believed 
in what I said. If they perceive this as my attitude, 
then it must be my attitude."
In order to understand if this inference process 
occurs, a speaker could be given two different types of 
feedback. One type of feedback would be that the audience 
was convinced or not convinced. The speaker would receive 
information that he had or had not persuaded the audience 
to accept his point of view. The other type of feedback
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would be information of the audience's perception of the 
speaker's attitude. The speaker would hear feedback which 
states that the audience perceived his statements to be 
his true attitude. For example, after giving his talk, 
a speaker might hear that the audience was convinced and 
that they perceived what he said as being representative 
of his true attitude. The present study independently 
manipulated these two types of feedback in order to see 
if, in fact, a speaker infers his attitude based on the 
information which he receives from an audience.
Several principles based on role theory and self­
perception theory were used to derive the hypotheses for 
this study. First of all, according to self-perception 
theory, individuals will use their behavior toward the 
attitude object and the cues in the environment to infer 
their attitudes. Secondly, since role theorists empha­
size the importance of other's external evaluation of 
one's attitude, the most influential type of feedback 
one receives is information about what others perceive 
his attitude to be. Third, if an individual receives 
information that an audience is convinced, he then uses 
a self-perception process to infer that the audience 
perceived his behavior to be representative of his 
attitude.
The first hypothesis is based on role theory's 
argument that feedback of other's perception of one's 
attitude is the primary process which takes place in
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attitude change. Specifically, it was expected that 
receiving feedback that the audience perceives the 
speaker's statements to be his true attitude will result 
in the speaker demonstrating greater attitude change 
than when he hears that the audience perceives his state­
ment as not being his real attitude, or when he receives 
no feedback about other's perception of his attitude.
Secondly, it was expected that when the speaker hears 
that the audience has been convinced (persuaded), he will 
demonstrate more attitude change than when the audience 
is unconvinced, or when the speaker receives no feedback 
as to whether or not the audience is convinced. This pre­
diction is based on the assumption that knowing that his 
behavior has convinced an audience causes the speaker 
to infer that his behavior represents his real attitude.
Third, it was expected that when a speaker receives 
both forms of information, the speaker will use available 
cues to infer his attitude. When a speaker receives 
information that the audience has been convinced and 
perceives his statements to be his true attitude, then 
the speaker should have the most attitude change about 
the topic he advocates. In this situation the speaker 
receives two types of information which will present 
him with the greatest number of consistent cues that his 
behavior represents his true attitude. In contrast, 
when the speaker hears that the audience is not convinced 
and do not perceive his statements to be representative
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of his true attitude then the speaker should have the 
least amount of attitude change. This outcome should 
occur because in this condition the greatest amount of 
consistent information is present which informs the 
speaker that it is not his true attitude.
On the other hand, in the conditions where a speaker 
receives conflicting information it is expected that direct 
information about a speaker's attitude will be more potent. 
When the speaker hears that the audience was unconvinved 
but perceived what he said as being his true attitude, 
he will demonstrate more attitude change than when he 
hears that the audience was convinced, but didn't think 
it was his true attitude. This prediction is based on 
the role theorists emphasis that feedback of one’s 
attitude from others is the most important information 
for inferring one's attitudes. Therefore, in this situa­
tion the more potent factor should be feedback of per­
ceived attitude.
Fourth, when the speaker receives no feedback about 
either factor from the audience, it is expected that he 
will indicate a moderate amount of attitude change.
When he does not receive any feedback, the speaker will 
look at his own behavior for cues. The fact that he 
chose to participate and chose to advocate a positive 
position will cause him to change his attitude toward 
the topic.
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Finally„ it is expected that when a speaker is informed 
that the audience was convinced, but receives no feedback 
about the audience’s perception of his attitude, he will 
demonstrate more attitude change than when he hears 
that the audience was convinced but did not perceive his 
statement to be his true attitude. This prediction is 
based on the assumption that in order for attitude change 
to take place, a speaker must make an inference about 
his attitude based on the feedback which he receives.
When he hears that he convinced an audience but they did 
not perceive his statement to be his true attitude, then 
he cannot infer that he has a positive attitude about 
the topic and there should be little attitude change.
Similarly, it is expected that there will be no 
difference when the speaker hears that the audience 
perceived what he said as being his true attitude but 
receives no feedback about convincing the audience and 
when the speaker hears that he convinced the audience 
but receives no feedback about the audience’s perception 
of his attitude. This will provide additional evidence 
that when a speaker finds that he convinced an audience, 
he infers his attitude from this feedback.
If these last two expectations are supported, then 
this would be supportive of the fact that individuals 
do make inferences about their attitudes based on feed­
back about whether or not they convinced an audience.
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Secondly, the results will provide additional evidence 
as to the effect consequences have in a self-perception 
paradigm. Finally, the study was designed to investigate 
not only how consequence variables influence the speaker's 
attitude toward the topic, but also how consequence 
variables influence the speaker's perception of other 
aspects of the situation.
METHOD
Design Overview
Subjects were induced to give speeches on a commer­
cial product to which they had little previous exposure. 
The basic procedure was similar to that used by Daniels 
and Prestholdt (1975)• Subjects were given a choice as 
to whether or not to participate in the study and were 
also given a choice as to whether or not they wanted 
to speak in favor of the proposed topic. A 3 x 3 fac­
torial design was conducted involving the independent 
manipulation of two types of feedback which the speaker 
received. After giving the speech, the speaker received 
feedback as to a) whether the audience was convinced, 
not convinced, or received no information regarding the 
convince factor, and b) whether, the audience felt that 
what the speaker said represented his true attitude, 
or was not his true attitude, or the speaker received 
no feedback as to the audience's perception of his true 
attitude.
Subjects
Subjects were recruited from introductory psychology 
classes. Recruitment was conducted by the experimenter 
passing sign-up sheets to each class. Subjects were free
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to decide whether or not they wanted to participate. 
Ninety-nine male and female undergraduate students were 
recruited. They were randomly assigned to experimental 
conditions with the constraint that the number of subjects 
in each condition be equal and conditions be counter­
balanced for sex. The subjects received extra credit 
for participation in the experiment.
Procedure
One subject was involved in each experimental session. 
When the subject arrived at the experimental room, he saw 
a sign stating "subjects for persuasion-communication 
study please wait here". This room contained a T.Y. 
monitor, which faced an arrangement of chairs in the room. 
The monitor was turned on, but there was no picture on 
the screen. When the experimenter arrived, he greeted 
the subject and explained the purpose of the experiment.
The experimenter explained that he was interested 
in finding out what important factors are involved in 
effective T.V. communications. It was emphasized that 
there would be relevant use made of the findings - 
"that with these findings and others, more effective 
and improved T.V. communications will be developed".
The experimenter also informed the subject of past 
research which had caused substantial improvements in 
the communication industry. The experimenter further 
informed the subject that the easiest way to study
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different types of communication was to have people talk 
about various types of products as people are most familiar 
with this form of communication because of its frequent 
use on T.V. The subjects were informed that their part 
in the evaluation would be to make up and deliver a short 
talk about a product called "Superstrong Strapping Tape" 
over closed circuit T.V. to an audience in another room.
The purpose of this talk would be to inform the audience 
that this is a valuable and useful product. The experi­
menter also informed the subjects that at the end of 
their talk the experimenter would ask the subject several 
general questions about the product. The experimenter 
further explained that after giving the talk the subject 
would listen to the audience's reaction and help the 
experimenter evaluate how the audience responded to the 
information which they had received.
Subjects were then given a choice as to whether or 
not they wanted to participate in the study. They were 
told that since they were the first to arrive, it would 
be convenient if they would serve as the speaker. They 
were informed at this point that if they did not want to 
participate, they would still receive experimental credit. 
If they said yes, the experimenter then continued by 
stating that since members of the audience would arrive 
shortly, they should go and get ready to make the pre­
sentation. The subject was taken to a room set up as 
a recording studio. The subject was seated at a table
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in front of a video camera with a T.V. monitor present 
on which the subject could view himself while making 
the speech. The subject was told that there was an 
intercom set up so that: 1) he could inform the experi­
menter if he recognized any of the audience over the 
intercom as it was important that possible biases be 
minimized, and 2) he would be able to listen to the 
audience's reaction after the talk was over, in order 
to help the experimenter evaluate the audience's responses.
The experimenter then left the room, explaining 
that he would have to greet the audience and that the 
subject could listen in to make sure that he did not 
know any of the participants. As he left he turned on 
the intercom which activated the first part of a tape 
recording which was the same for all conditions. On 
the tape the subject heard that members of the audience 
had arrived or were arriving and then he heard the 
experimenter arrive. The subject then heard the experi­
menter inform the audience that he would like to have 
their reactions to a new product. The experimenter 
then asked the audience how they felt about new products, 
for instance types of tape. The audience replied by 
making non committal answers, that they really had not 
heard anything about the product and that they would 
have to wait before making up their minds. The subject 
was informed, in effect, that the audience was neutral.
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After briefing the audience the experimenter returned 
to the recording area and asked the subject is he recog­
nized any of the audience,, If he said yes, the experimenter 
asked the subject who, and checked the name against the 
master list and informed the subject that the person 
was not present and was probably just someone who 
sounded similar.
The experimenter then told the subject that since 
he was fully aware of what he had to do, it was still 
his choice if he wanted to continue. If he said yes, 
then the experimenter induced the subject to make a 
positive statement in favor of the product by informing 
the subject that although he did not have to, the experi­
menter would appreciate it if he would talk in favor of 
the product. The experimenter explained that informa­
tion had already been collected about the audience’s 
reaction to negative points of view and now the experi­
menter would like to see how the audience would react 
to a positive point of view. This was done in order 
that the subject would feel that he had been given a 
choice in taking a positive point of view. The subject 
was informed that it was his choice and his decision 
and when the subject responded affirmatively, the ex­
perimenter gave the subject a list of major points which 
he could use to make up his talk. The subject was in­
formed that he could make changes and deletions and 
emphasize whatever he wanted to emphasize. The subject
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was told that his talk should be about three minutes 
long. Subjects were also told that the main idea was to 
make some sort of testimonial. The testimonial should 
be in favor of the product and that they should try as 
hard as they could to inform the audience that this was 
a good product as the audience would be asked later to 
commit themselves to a six-month home use trial. The 
subjects were told that if members of the audience 
committed themselves to a home use trial, then this 
would be a further indication of how effective the talk 
had been.
The subject was given five minutes to make up his 
talk and when the subject indicated that he was finished, 
the experimenter turned on the camera, notified the 
audience that the presentation was to begin and the 
subject gave his presentation. When he finished, the 
experimenter then asked the subject to summarize how 
valuable he felt the product was, and whether or not 
he would recommend it.
Manipulat ions
After the speech was over the subject was told to 
remain in the room while the experimenter went to ask 
the audience some questions. In order to focus the 
subject's attention on the communication over the inter­
com the experimenter gave a rating form to the subject 
in order that he could record the audience's reactions,
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and then turned on the intercom and left the room. This 
activated a tape recorder which presented the feedback 
from the audience. The experimenter was blind to the 
condition until the tape was played. The subjects were 
assigned to conditions in random order. On the tape 
members of the audience informed the experimenter in the 
convinced condition either that they were convinced, 
or they were not convinced. They stated that they felt 
that what the speaker said was real and they were con­
vinced because "the product seemed to be very useful, and 
that it seemed that they might like to try the product.
In the unconvinced condition, they stated that they were 
not convinced, that they did not believe in what the 
speaker said, and that they did not think they would like 
to try it. They also stated that they did not think 
that the tape was all that good. In the third condition, 
the audience gave no indication as to whether or not they 
were convinced. Therefore, in this condition the audi­
ence is basically informing the subject of what the 
audience’s attitude is towards the product.
The other variable which was manipulated was the 
audience’s perception of the speaker’s attitude. The 
audience informed the experimenter that they felt that 
what the speaker said was his true attitude, or they 
felt it was not his true attitude, or gave no indication 
of how they felt about the speaker’s attitude. The 
audience stated that the speaker seemed to believe in
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what he said, and it seemed that it was his real attitude, 
that he was sincere, that he must really believe in what 
he said, and that it must be his real attitude. The 
audience stated that they felt this to be true because 
of the effort which the subject made, that he really 
tried to "put it across". Or, the audience stated that 
they did not think he was sincere, that he did not seem 
to believe in what he was talking about, and that he did 
not have a positive attitude about the product, that 
what he said did not represent his true attitude, because 
he really did not seem to try very hard. Or the audience 
gave no indication as to what they felt the subject's 
attitude was. Basically, in this condition the speaker 
hears the audience’s perception of his attitude about 
the product.
In the no feedback/no feedback condition, everything 
was identical until the experimenter turned on the inter­
com to go ask the audience the evaluation questions.
When the experimenter turned on the intercom, all that 
was present was a squealing noise. The experimenter 
hit the intercom and the noise continued. He then 
turned it off and asked the speaker to wait while he 
went down and excused the audience. He explained to 
the speaker that if the speaker can not help in the 
evaluation, there was no reason to continue. The 
experimenter then left to excuse the audience. In 
several minutes the experimenter returned and carried
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out the rest of the study. At this point, all conditions 
were again equivalent.
Thus, there were nine feedback conditions; convinced- 
no feedback, not convinced-no feedback, true attitude-no 
feedback, not true attitude-no feedback, convinced-true 
attitude, convinced-not true attitude, not convinced-true 
attitude, not convinced-not true attitude, and no feedback- 
no feedback.
After the audience had finished making comments, the 
speaker heard the experimenter summarize the audience's 
remarks. The speaker then heard the experimenter explain 
to the audience that the first part of their task was 
over. For the second part, they were to leave and go to 
another room where they would be interviewed by another 
experimenter. The experimenter informed the audience 
of where they should go. The audience then left and 
the experimenter returned to the room where the speaker 
was waiting.
Dependent Variables
After the experimenter returned from questioning 
the audience, the experimenter informed the subject that 
the study was over and that he could leave. Before the 
subject went out the door, the experimenter remembered 
that the subject had to fill out a Psychology Department 
questionnaire. On this questionnaire were the dependent
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measures in the form of 31-point bipolar scaled questions 
with the scale being labeled at 5-point intervals.
The questions on the questionnaire dealt with a
series of topics generally concerning experiments. The 
subjects were asked to fill out questions pertaining to 
demographic data along with questions which were designed 
to elicit information concerning the subject's attitude 
and perception about intensity of behavior, cause of 
behavior and feelings about the topic. The pertinent 
questions were:
6. How much choice do you feel you were given by the
experimenter as to whether or not you could parti­
cipate in the experiment?
7. How do you feel towards the experimenter?
8. How do you feel about the task which you did?
9. How do you feel about the product which you
advocated?
10. How useful do you feel the product would be?
11. How valuable as an aid around the home do you feel
this product is?
12. Do you think that sometime in the future you will 
use this product?
13. How hard was the task which you performed?
Ik. How much effort do you feel you put into the task?
15. If there was an audience involved in the study
which you participated in, how did you feel about 
the audience?
16. If you received information from an audience, how
accurate do you think this information was?
17. How well do you think you did on the task?
3̂
The subjects were told that the data was confidential 
and would be viewed only by a psychology experimentation 
committee which was reviewing various types of research 
being conducted at the school. At this point the experi­
menter asked the subject to fill out the questionnaire 
and seal it in an envelope marked "Psychology Experimen­
tation Committeep Psychology Department". The experimenter 
then left the room and the subject completed the ques­
tionnaire and gave the sealed envelope to the experimenter.
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RESULTS
A total of one hundred and twelve individuals 
arrived at the designated area to participate in the 
research. Five females and three males refused to par­
ticipate in the study, one female and two males were 
dropped from.the study because they indicated during 
the study that they did not believe the deception, and 
one male and one female were dropped because of equipment 
failures during the study. Thus, a total of 99 subjects, 
11 per cell, participated in the experiment. Each cell 
had six males and five females.
The individuals who were dropped from the study were 
evenly distributed throughout the conditions. Since no 
single cell had a disproportional number discarded, it 
appears that there were no unintentional bias induced 
by the non-participation of these subjects.
Manipulation Check Measures
Six questions constituted the manipulation checks. 
One question, concerning subject's perception of choice, 
was in the "Psychology Department Questionnaire" which 
subjects filled out after they had completed the experi­
ment . The other five questions were contained in the 
"Communication and Evaluation Form" which subjects filled
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out under the pretense of helping the experimenter 
evaluate the audience reaction. All questions were in 
a 31 point bi-polar scale, except for question three on 
the communication and evaluation form which had a 16 
point scale and question six on the Psychology Department 
Questionnaire which had a 21 point scale.
Perception of Choice
On the "Psychology Department Questionnaire" subjects 
were asked to indicate how much choice they felt they had 
about participating in the experiment. A score of 21 
indicated "quite a bit" and the other end of the scale 
was scored as one, which was equivalent to "no choice".
The means for the nine cells ranged from 16.64 to 20.68.
In terms of scale labels, these means indicate that 
subjects felt that they had a "good deal" of choice to 
"quite a bit" of choice. Therefore, all subjects per­
ceived that they had a high amount of choice as to whether 
or not they could participate in the study. This demon­
strates that the choice manipulation was successful as 
all participants felt they were given an adequate choice.
In order to determine if subjects perception of 
choice was influenced by the feedback which they received 
an ANOVA was conducted using data obtained from the choice 
question. The results indicated that the only significant 
effect was the attitude factor (B) main effect, F (2, 90) = 






Question 6 - Choice
Source df MS P
Convince Feedback (A) 2 11=598 1.369
Attitude Feedback (B) 2 32.205 3.80^*
A x B k IO.985 I.297
















Convinced 20.00 18.82 19.86 (19-56)a
Not
Convinced 19-50 18.86 20.00 (19.45)
No
Feedback 20.68 16.64 18.14 (18.48)
(20.06) (18.11) (19-33)
Note. Scale ; 21-quite a bit to 1--none.
a Numbers in parenthesis represent main effect means.
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indicated that the true attitude mean (20.06) was greater 
than the not true attitude mean (18.11), The no feedback 
mean (19.33) was somewhat closer to the true attitude 
mean than it was to the not true attitude mean. An 
orthogonal comparison between true attitude and not true 
attitude indicated that true attitude feedback was signi­
ficantly , F (1, 90) = 7.^5 > > greater than not
true attitude feedback. Apparently a subject's perception 
of the amount of choice he had about participating in 
the experiment was influenced by feedback about the 
audience's perception of his attitude. Subjects who 
heard that the audience perceived their statement to be 
their real attitude felt they had more choice than subjects 
who heard that the audience perceived their statement 
not to be their true attitude.
Perception of attitude and convince feedback
Questions on the Communication and Persuasion Form 
were designed to determine whether or not individuals 
were correctly perceiving the feedback. The questions 
were: 1) how effective did this form of communication
seem to be, 2) how favorable or unfavorable do you think 
the audience’s feelings were about the product, 3) to what 
degree did the audience seem to believe you, M-) how sincere 
or insincere did the audience perceive your presentation 
to be, and 5) overall, how positive or negative was 
the audience's reaction.
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Because the no feedback-no feedback condition could 
not be included in this analysis, a one-way ANOVA of the 
eight feedback conditions was calculated for each question 
(see Table 3 for ANOVA, and Table 4 for means). The feed­
back effects for question one, F (7, 80) = 23.710,
£ = .0001, question three, F (7s 80) = 39-982, p ~ -0001, 
and question five, F (7s 80) = 51-756, £ = -0001s were 
all highly significant. Identical orthogonal comparisons 
were then conducted on each question which compared the 
combined positive conditions (i.e. condition 1, true 
attitude-convinced, condition 3s true attitude-no feedback, 
and condition 7s convinced-no feedback) with the combined 
negative conditions (i.e. condition 5 s not true attitude- 
not convinced, condition 6 , not convinced-no feedback, 
and condition 8 , not true attitude-no feedback). Highly 
significant differences between positive and negative 
feedback were found on question one, F (1, 80) = 159-932 , 
p4 .01, on question three, F (1, 80) = 275.995, jxv.- 01, 
and on question five, F (1, 80) = 6,476, p^ .01. This 
indicates that subjects were able to discern a significant 
difference between the positive and negative feedback 
which they received. Subjects who received positive 
feedback indicated that this form of communication was 
more effective, that the audience seemed to believe them 
and that overall, the audience's reaction was positive.
On the other hand, subjects who received negative feed­
back indicated that this form of communication was
Table 3







MS F MS F
Feedback (C) 7 732.62 23.71**** 999-53 ^3-01**** 360.08 39.98****
Within-cell
error 80 30.90 23.2^ 9.01
**** jo <. 0001
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1. How effective did this form of 
communication seem to be? Scales 
31-effective to 1-ineffective. 25.82 20.00 26.45 15.59
2. How favorable or unfavorable 
do you think the audience's feelings 
were about the product? Scales 
31-favorable to 1-unfavorable. 26.95 23.82 26.59 10.32
3. To what degree did the 
audience seem to believe you? 
Scales 16-a lot to 1-none. 15.14 7.32 14.00 8.50
4. How sincere or insincere did 
the audience perceive your presen­
tation to be? Scales 31-sincere 
to 1-insincere. 27.82 7.00 23.68 26.59
5. Overall, how positive or negative
was the audience’s reaction? Scales
31-very positive to 1-very negative. 26.45 15.55 26.86 11.18

























1. How effective did this form of 
communication seem to be? Scales 
31-effective to 1-ineffective. 8. 64 6.91 23.86 8.68
2. How favorable or unfavorable 
do you think the audience8s feelings 
were about the product? Scales 
31-favorable to 1-unfavorable. 7.50 3-91 23.18 9.50
3. To what degree did the 
audience seem to believe you? 
Scales 16-a lot to 1-none. 2.32 1.09 13.64 2.55
4. How sincere or insincere did 
the audience perceive your presen­
tation to be? Scales 31-sincere 
to 1-insincere. 5.41 11.18 28.36 5.45
5. Overall, how positive or negative
was the audience's reaction? Scales
31-very positive to 1-very negative. 5.45 5.32 24.77 7.64
•£-
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ineffective, the audience did not believe them, and that 
overall, the audience’s reaction was negative.
For question two, "how favorable or unfavorable do 
you think the audience’s feelings were about the product," 
the ANOVA was also highly significant, F (7, 80) = 43.015, 
jd = ,0001. A comparison was made between condition 2, 
not true attitude-convinced (mean = 23,82) and condition 
4 , true attitude-not convinced (mean = 10.32) as these two 
conditions were least likely to be significantly different 
because of conflicting information from attitude feedback. 
This comparison would delineate whether or not the speaker 
was able to discern the audience favorable or unfavorable 
attitude toward the product. The orthogonal comparison 
indicated a significant difference, F (1, 80) = 43.26,
"015 between the two conditions. Thus, the subject 
was able to recognize that the audience had a favorable 
or unfavorable feeling about the product.
For question four, "how sincere or insincere did 
the audience perceive your presentation to be," the ANOVA 
was also highly significant, F (7, 80) = 78.310, £ = .0001, 
The mean for condition 4, true attitude-not convinced 
(mean = 26.59) was greater than condition 2, not true 
attitude-convinced (mean = 7*00). Therefore, a comparison 
was made between condition 2, not true attitude-convinced 
and condition 4, true attitude-not convinced as these 
two cells were least likely to be significantly different 
because of conflicting information from convince
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feedback. This comparison determined if the speaker was 
able to delineate the feedback concerning the audience's 
perception of his attitude, i. e. the sincerity or insin­
cerity of his statement. The orthogonal comparison 
indicated a highly significant difference, F (1, 80) = 
132.891, 2 <  °01° This indicates that the speaker was 
able to delineate whether or not the audience perceived 
his statement as being his real attitude.
Overall, these results demonstrate that subjects 
felt that they had a choice as to whether or not they 
could participate, and that subjects were correctly 
perceiving the essential parts of the feedback. There­
fore, later responses to the dependent measures were 
not a result of possible misinterpretations of the 
feedback.
Attitude Change
Attitude change toward the product
The attitude items (questions nine, ten, eleven, and 
twelve) on the "Psychology Department Questionnaire" 
were designed to determine the speaker's attitude toward 
the product. These questions were in a 31-point bi-polar 
scale.
A multivariate analysis of variance was used to 
determine if there were any overall significant treatment 
effects on the subject’s attitude toward the product.
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A univariate analysis was used to determine the effects 
of the treatments on specific terms.
For the MANOVA, the Hotelling-Lawley5s Trace criteria 
indicated an overall significant main effect for convince 
feedback (A), F (8, 172) = 9-935* £ = .0001, an overall 
significant main effect for attitude feedback (B),
F (8, 172) = 2 .239, 2 = •027s and a significant inter­
action, F (16, 342) = 1.809s £ = .028. Apparently, the 
treatments and their combinations had an overall effect 
on the speaker’s attitude toward the product.
Univariate analyses were then calculated to determine 
the effect of the treatments on each of the separate 
questions. These analyses indicated very similar results 
for each question. Therefore, for the sake of clarity, 
a subject’s score on the four questions were combined 
to produce an overall "attitude toward product”. The 
analysis of each separate question will not be discussed. 
Instead, the results which will be presented is a 3 x 3 
ANOVA on the subjects "attitude toward product". Table 
5 indicates the specific name and number of each condition. 
The following presentation of results will use these 
names and numbers for identification purposes.
The ANOVA (see Table 6 ) for "attitude toward product" 
indicated a significant main effect for convince feedback
( A) ,  F (2, 90) = 3 8 .2 0 9 , 2 ~ .0001, a significant main 
effect for attitude feedback (B), F (2, 9 0) = 3 .5 2 9 ,
2  = .0 3 2 , and a significant interaction, F (4, 90) = 3 .0 9 8 ,
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Table 5 












Convinced (1) (2) (3)
Not
Convinced (4) (5) (6)
No
Feedback (7) (8) (9)
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Table 6
Analysis of Variance of Attitude Toward Product
Source SS df MS F
Convince Feedback (A) 1054.850 2 527.425 38.209****
Attitude Feedback (B) 97.417 2 48.708 3.529*
A x B 171.065 4 42.766 3.098*
Within-cell error 1242.304 90 13.803
* £ < 0 5
* * * * £<rroooi
50
£ = .0192. The means (see Table 7) for the main effect 
of the convince factor (A) indicated that the mean for 
convince feedback (mean = 27.35) was similar to the mean 
of no feedback (mean = 24.93) hut the mean for not con­
vinced (mean = 19-5^) was much lower. The means for the 
main effect of the attitude factor (B) indicated that 
the mean for true attitude feedback (mean = 25.32) was 
greater than not true attitude feedback (mean = 23.46) 
and the mean for no feedback (mean = 23.04) was very 
close to not true attitude. The significant interactions 
allowed examination of specific cell means in order to 
test the comparisons which would indicate support or non­
support of a specific hypothesis. Therefore, the specific 
interaction was not examined, but paired comparisons 
indicated by each hypothesis were examined.
In order to test the specific experimental hypotheses, 
the significant main effects and interaction were sup­
plemented by calculating a Duncan's Multiple Range test 
on individual paired comparisons.
The first hypothesis was that receiving feedback 
that the audience perceives the speaker's statements to 
be his true attitude will result in a more positive 
attitude than when the audience perceives his statement 
as not being his real attitude or when he receives no 
feedback about their perception of his attitude. The 
significant main effect for attitude feedback supports 
this hypothesis. It was found that receiving true attitude
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Table 7












Convinced 28.27 28.42 25.36 (27.35)a
Not
Convinced 20.32 20.10 18.20 (19.5*0
No
Feedback 27.37 21.86 25.55 (24.93)
(25.32) (23.46) (23.04)
Note. Scales 31-1» higher rating denotes more 
favorable attitude toward product 
a Numbers in parenthesis represent main effect means
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feedback resulted in a more positive attitude toward the 
product than receiving not true attitude feedback. It 
was also found that receiving true attitude feedback 
resulted in a more positive attitude than receiving no 
feedback about the audience's perception of the subject's 
attitude.
In order to provide a more stringent test of this 
hypothesis, two comparisons were made. The first com­
parison was between condition 7 » true attitude-no feedback, 
and condition 8 , not true attitude-no feedback, and the 
second comparison was between condition 7 s true attitude- 
no feedback, and condition 9? no feedback-no feedback.
It was found that subjects who received true attitude 
feedback (mean = 27.37), had a significantly (diff =
5.51. £ <T*01) more positive attitude about the product 
than those who received not true attitude feedback 
(mean = 21.86). However, the differences between positive 
attitude feedback (mean = 27.37) and no feedback-no 
feedback (mean = 25-55) were not significant. These 
comparisons then, provide only partial support for the 
first hypothesis. That is, subjects who received true 
attitude feedback did have a more positive attitude than 
subjects who received not true attitude feedback, but 
they did not differ from subjects who did not receive 
any feedback.
Thus, although the main effects demonstrates that 
true attitude feedback resulted in a more positive
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attitude than not true attitude feedback, or no feedback, 
the paired comparisons indicated that true attitude feed­
back was not more effective than no feedback.
The second hypothesis, that when the speaker hears 
that the audience is convinced, he will have a more 
positive attitude than when the audience is unconvinced, 
or when there is no feedback about the convince factor, 
was also partially supported. The significant main 
effect indicated that receiving convince feedback resulted 
in a more positive attitude than receiving not convinced 
feedback, but did not result in a more positive attitude 
than getting no feedback regarding the convince treatment.
To further test this hypothesis, two comparisons 
were mades one, between condition 3 » convinced-no feedback, 
and condition 6 , not convinced-no feedback, and a second 
between condition J, convinced-no feedback and condition 
9, no feedback-no feedback. The results indicated that 
subjects in condition 3» convinced-no feedback (mean =
25.36) indicated a significantly (diff = 7*16, .01)
more positive attitude toward the product than subjects 
who heard that the audience was not convinced (mean =
18.20). However, the difference between condition 3 s 
convinced-no feedback (mean = 25,36) and condition 9, 
no feedback-no feedback (mean = 25.55) was not significant. 
This indicates that subjects who received convince feed­
back had a significantly more positive attitude than 
those who received not convinced feedback. However, in
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contrast to expectations but consistent with the results 
of the convince main effects, attitudes of those who 
received no feedback were not significantly different 
from those who received positive convince feedback.
The third hypothesis predicted that when a speaker 
receives information that the audience has been convinced 
and perceives his statements to be his true attitude, 
the speaker should have the most positive attitude, and 
when the speaker hears that the audience is not convinced 
and do not perceive his statements to be his true atti­
tude, then the speaker should have the least positive 
attitude. In order to test this hyoothesis, a comparison 
was made between condition 1, true attitude-convinced 
and condition 3s convinced-no feedback and between condition 
1, true attitude-convinced and condition 7, true attitude- 
no feedback. It was found that condition 1, true attitude- 
convinced (mean = 28,27) was not significantly greater 
than either condition 3» convinced-no feedback (mean =
25.36) or condition 7, true attitude-no feedback (mean =
27.37). Also, several comparisons of negative feedback 
were made to see if combined negative feedback would result 
in a less positive attitude. A comparison was made 
between condition 5s rot true attitude-not convinced,
and condition 6, not convinced-no feedback, and between 
condition 5. not true attitude-not convinced, and condi­
tion 8, not true attitude-no feedback. It was found 
that condition 5* not true attitude-not convinced
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(mean = 20,10) was not significantly less than either 
condition 6, not convinced-no feedback (mean = 18,20) 
or condition 8, not true attitude-no feedback (mean = 
21,86). Although condition 1, true attitude-convinced 
had a higher mean than condition 3 condition 7» the 
above hypothesis was not supported. This indicates that 
positive or negative information was not additive, i. e. 
adding two types of positive feedback or two types of 
negative feedback did not result in a significantly more 
positive or negative attitude.
Since it was assumed that attitudinal feedback would 
be more effective than convince feedback, it was expected 
that when a speaker receives conflicting information, 
direct information about a speaker’s attitude would be 
more potent. Specifically, the fourth hypothesis stated 
that when the speaker hears that the audience was un­
convinced but perceived what he said as being his true 
attitude, he will indicate a more positive attitude than 
when he hears that the audience was convinced, but did 
not think it was his true attitude. In order to test 
this hypothesis, a comparison was made between condition 
4, true attitude-not convinced and condition 2, not true 
attitude-convinced. The results not only failed to 
support this prediction but in fact, just the opposite 
was found. The results indicated that condition 2, not 
true attitude-convinced (mean = 28.42) was significantly 
greater (diff = 8.10, jd<  .01) than condition 4, true
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attitude-not convinced (mean = 20.32). This indicates 
that convinced feedback was more potent in influencing 
the speaker's attitude than was attitude feedback-
The fifth hypothesis, that when the speaker received 
no feedback about either factor from the audience, he 
would indicate a more positive attitude toward the product 
than if they had received negative feedback, was supported. 
In order to test this hypothesis comparisons were made 
between condition 9n no feedback-no feedback and condi­
tion 8, not true attitude-no feedback, between condition 
9, no feedback-no feedback and condition 6, not convinced- 
no feedback, and between condition 9? no feedback-no 
feedback and condition 5» not true attitude-not convinced. 
All three comparisons were significant. Condition 9, no 
feedback-no feedback (mean = 25.55) was found to be sig­
nificantly greater (diff = 3.69, p C  .05) than condition 
8, not true attitude-no feedback (mean = 21.86), signi­
ficantly greater (diff = 7 • 35» £C°01) than condition 6, 
not convinced-no feedback (mean = 18.20) and significantly 
greater (diff = 5*^5» p<2 .01) than condition 5 * not true 
attitude-not convinced (mean = 20.10). This indicated 
that subjects who received negative feedback about either 
factor or both factors demonstrated a less positive atti­
tude toward the product than those who received no feed­
back at all. Thus, feedback that the audience was not 
convinced and/or did not believe the statements repre­
sented the subject's true attitude, resulted in a
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less positive attitude toward the product.
The sixth hypothesis was concerned with the relative 
influence of positive forms of each type of feedback. 
Specifically, it was predicted that there will be no 
difference when the speaker hears that an audience per­
ceived what he said as being his attitude and when he 
convinced the audience. In order to test this hypothesis, 
a comparison was made between condition 7 » true attitude-
no feedback, and condition 3> convinced-no feedback.
The results supported this hypothesis. The difference 
between condition 7? true attitude-no feedback (mean =
27.37) and condition 3» convinced-no feedback (mean =
25.36) was not significant. This indicated that the 
relative influence of the positive form of each type of 
feedback was approximately the same.
The seventh hypothesis concerned whether negative 
attitudinal information would negate the effect of feed­
back that the audience had been convinced. Specifically, 
it was predicted that when a speaker is informed that
the audience was convinced but received no feedback
about the audience's perception of his attitude, the 
speaker would have a more positive attitude than when 
he hears that the audience was convinced but did not 
perceive his statement to be his true attitude,, In 
order to test this prediction, a comparison was made 
between condition 3» convinced-no feedback and condition 
2, not true attitude-convinced. It was found that
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condition J>, convinced-no feedback (mean = 25.36) was not 
significantly greater than condition 2, not true attitude- 
convinced (mean = 28.^2)„ This indicates that the hypo­
thesis was not supported and that negative feedback about 
the subject's attitude did not significantly affect 
the subject's attitude when he received information that 
the audience was convinced.
Overall, the main effects and the comparisons indi­
cated that both types of feedback had a significant 
effect on the attitude of the subjects toward the product. 
However, it appears that negative feedback (not convinced 
or not true attitude) was more influential than positive 
feedback (convinced or true attitude). This can readily 
be seen by comparing positive and negative feedback con­
ditions to the no feedback condition. Using condition 
9, no feedback-no feedback as a base point, either form 
of negative feedback resulted in a significantly less 
positive attitude towards the product than receiving no 
feedback at all. However, subjects who received either 
form of positive feedback did not have a significantly 
more positive attitude about the product than the subjects 
who received no feedback at all (condition 9).
In addition, not only did negative feedback have 
a greater effect in influencing attitudes but condition 
6, not convinced-no feedback (mean = 18.20) was signi­
ficantly less (diff = 3• 66, jd«C .05) than condition 8, not 
true attitude-no feedback (mean = 21.86), This indicates
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that not convinced feedback had a greater negative impact 
on the subject"s attitude than did feedback that the 
audience did not believe the subject was expressing his 
own attitude.
Further evidence of the greater influence of the 
convince factor can also be demonstrated by comparing 
differing levels of one type of feedback while the other 
type of feedback is constantly positive. The relative 
effect of the convince treatment can be demonstrated by 
comparing condition 1, true attitude-convinced (mean = 
28.27) with condition true attitude-not convinced 
(mean = 20.32). This comparison resulted in a significant 
difference (diff = 7»95» £ <  .01) between condition 1 and 
condition When true attitude feedback was constant, 
convince feedback resulted in a more positive attitude 
than not convinced feedback. That is, the manipulation 
of convince feedback significantly affected attitude. 
However, as previously indicated in hypothesis seven, 
when positive convince feedback is constant, the manipu­
lation of perceived attitude feedback did not have a 
significant effect.
Change related to task variables
The four task related questions were all in 31- 
point bi-polar scales. The questions dealt with subject’s 
feelings about the tasks how they felt about the task,
6o
how hard the task was, how much effort was required, and 
their perception of how well they did on the task.
For the MANOVA of task related questions (8 , 13, 1^, 
17) f the Hotelling-Lawley"s Trace criteria indicated a 
significant main effect for convince feedback (A), F (8 , 
172) = 2 .7 9 8 , £ = 0OO6 , a significant main effect for 
attitude feedback (B) , F (8 , 172) = 4-.6^2, 2  = .0001, 
and a significant interaction, F (16, 3^2) = 2.128,
2  = .007. These significant findings indicate that the 
treatment conditions had an effect on the subjects over­
all feelings about the task. Univariate analyses were 
calculated in order to determine the effect of the treat­
ments on each of the separate questions.
On question 8 , "how do you feel about the task you 
did", the univariate ANOVA (see Table 8 ) indicated a 
significant attitude factor (B) main effect, F (2, 9 0) = 
^.08, 2  = *0 1 9 6 . The means (Table 9) for the attitude 
main effect indicated that the mean for true attitude 
feedback (mean = 2 3 .3 2) was greater than the mean for
not true attitude (mean = 1 8 .6 8 ) and also greater than the
mean of no feedback (mean = 21.9*0. An orthogonal com­
parison indicated that true attitude feedback was signi­
ficantly greater, F (1, 90) = 7 .7 4̂ , 2<»°1> than not
true attitude feedback, but not significantly greater 
than no feedback. This indicates that feedback of 
attitudes influenced subject's feelings about the task. 
Also the results indicated that attitude feedback was
Table 8













Feedback(A) 2 III.563 2.436 47.404 1.112 9.465 .389 266.828 7.568**
Attitude
Feedback(B) 2 187.048 4.084* 78.426 1.840 177.244 7.278** 365.836 10.376***
A x B 4 52.869 1.154 137.797 3.233* 53.919 2.214 89.071 2.527*
Within-cell
error 90 45-795 42.622 24.354 35.258
* £<-05 
















Convinced 22.64 21.50 25.55 (23.23)
Not
Convinced 21.86 16.59 20.23 (19-56)
No
Feedback 25.^5 17.95 20.05 (21.15)
(23.32) (18.68) (21.94)
Note. Scale; 31-like very much to 1-dislike very much.
SI Numbers in parenthesis represent main effect means.
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more influential than convince feedback as attitude feed­
back significantly influenced the subjects evaluation of 
their performance, but convince feedback did not.
The ANOVA (Table 8 ) of question 13, "how hard was 
the task which you performed / 1 indicated no significant 
main effects. However, a significant interaction did 
occur between the convince factor (A) and attitude factor
(B), F (^, 90) = 3-23 » £  = .016. A Duncan's Multiple
Range test was used to determine significant differences
between conditions. Basically, the significant inter­
action was due to one cell (see Table 10). The analysis 
indicated that condition 7 , true attitude-no feedback 
was significantly less than every other condition. This 
result indicated that in judging the difficulty of the 
task, when subjects received only true attitude feedback,
they rated the task as being easier than did subjects
in any other condition.
The ANOVA (Table 8) of question 14, "how much effort 
do you feel you put into the task," indicated an attitude 
factor (B) main effect, F (2, 9 0) = 7 .2 7 8 , p = .0015 and 
an interaction effect which approached significance,
F (^, 90) = 2.214-, p  = .072. The means (Table 11) for 
the attitude main effect indicated that the mean for 
true attitude feedback (mean = 2 3 .^1) was greater than 
the mean for not true attitude (mean = 18.79) and also 
greater than the mean for no feedback (mean = 21.4-1).
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Table 10












Convinced 16.23 17.45 15.09 (16.26)a
Not
Convinced 18.04 17.00 13.82 (16.29)
No
Feedback 8.32 17.27 17.00 (14.20)
(14.20) (17.24) (1 5 .3 0)
Note. Scale: 31-very hard to 1-very easy.
a Numbers in parenthesis represent main effect means.
65
Table 11 










Convinced 21.36 18.50 22.95 (20.94)a
Not
Convinced 23.59 19.00 22.86 (21.82)
No
Feedback 25.27 18.86 18.41 (20.85)
(23.41) (18.79) (21.41)
Note. Scale*. 31-very effortful to 1 very effortless.
o Numbers in parenthesis represent main effect means.
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Because the interaction approaches significance, it 
may he important to look at some of the same comparisons 
that had heen conducted on previous data. To determine the 
effect of attitudinal feedback when not confounded with 
convince feedback, two comparisons using a Duncan's Multiple 
Range test were made; first, between condition 7, true 
attitude-no feedback, and condition 8, not true attitude- 
no feedback, and second, between condition 7> true attitude- 
no feedback and condition 9* no feedback-no feedback. The 
comparisons indicated that condition 7» true attitude- 
no feedback (mean = 25,27) was significantly greater 
(diff = 6.4-1, p <  .01) than the not true attitude-no feedback 
condition (mean = 18.86), and significantly greater (diff = 
6.86, 2^ *°1) than the no feedback-no feedback condition 
(mean = 18,4-1) .
To further determine the effect of attitudinal feedback 
on the subjects perception of effort, even when the feedback 
was confounded with conflicting convince feedback, a com­
parison was made between condition 4, true attitude-not 
convinced, and condition 2, not true attitude-convinced.
The results indicated that condition 4-, true attitude-not 
convinced (mean = 23.59) was significantly greater (diff = 
5 .09, £ < . 05) than condition 2, not true attitude-convinced 
(mean = 18.50).
These comparisons for attitude feedback appear to 
indicate that subjects who received only true attitude 
feedback felt they put more effort into the task than
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either subjects who received only not true attitude 
feedbacks or subjects who received no feedback about 
either factor. It also appears that even when conflicting 
information is present, subjects who receive information 
that the audience perceives their statements to be their 
true attitude but are not convinced feel they put more 
effort into the task than subjects who receive information 
that the audience is convinced but do not perceive their 
statement to be their real attitude. Therefore, it 
appears that attitude feedback affects perception of 
effort but convince feedback does not. Moreover, not 
only was attitude feedback more influential than convince 
feedback, but subjects who received true attitude feed­
back felt they put more effort into the task than those 
who received no feedback or negative attitudinal feedback.
The ANOVA (Table 8) on question 17, "how well do you 
think you did on the task," indicated a significant convince 
factor (A) main effect, F (2, 90) = 7•568, p = .0013, a 
significant attitude factor (B) main effect, F (2, 90) = 
10.376, p = .0002, and a significant interaction, F (4, 90)
= 2 .527, p = .04-5. The means (see Table 12) for the con­
vince main effect indicated that the convince feedback 
mean (20.24) was greater than the mean for not convinced 
(mean = 14-.67) , and the mean for no feedback (mean = 16.48) 
was closer to the not convinced mean than to the convinced 
feedback mean. The means for the attitude feedback main 
effect indicated that the mean for true attitude feedback
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Table 12 










Convinced 21.95 17.36 21. kl (20.2k)a
Not
Convinced 16.77 12.23 15.00 (14.67)
No
Feedback 23.59 13.14 12.73 (16.48)
(20.77) {Ik.2k) (16.38)
Note. Scale: 31-a very good job to 1-very bad.
a Numbers in parenthesis represent main effect means.
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(mean = 20.77) was greater than the not true attitude 
mean (1^.24), and the mean for no feedback (mean = 16.38) 
was closer to the not true attitude mean than to the 
true attitude mean.
Although the interaction was significant, the cell 
means generally indicate a similar patterns positive 
feedback leads to positive perception of performance. 
Receiving positive feedback produces the highest means 
and getting negative feedback produces the lowest means. 
The interaction appears to be due to the low score in 
condition 5s not true attitude-not convinced, and in 
condition 9s no feedback-no feedback.
Based on the significant interaction certain paired 
comparisons can be examined. An important question again 
deals with the effect of attitudinal feedback unconfounded 
by convince feedback. In order to examine this question, 
a Duncan's Multiple Range test was used to determine the 
effect of attitudinal feedback. Two comparisons were 
mades one between condition 7s true attitude-no feedback 
and condition 8, not true attitude-no feedback, and a 
second comparison was made between condition 7, true 
attitude-no feedback and condition 9s no feedback-no 
feedback. The results indicated that subjects in condi­
tion 7. true attitude-no feedback (mean = 23.59) felt 
they did significantly better (diff = 10.^5* £-<r”01) on 
the task than subjects in condition 8, not true attitude- 
no feedback (mean = 13.1^), and also felt they did
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significantly better (diff = 10*86, .01) on the task
than subjects in condition 9 s no feedback-no feedback 
(mean = 12.73)• These results indicate that subjects 
who received true attitude feedback felt they had done 
a better job on the task than subjects who received either 
no feedback or not true attitude feedback.
Another important question deals with the effect 
of convince feedback when unconfounded by attitudinal 
feedback. In order to investigate this question, two 
comparisons were mades one, a comparison between con­
dition 3* convinced-no feedback and condition 6, not 
convinced-no feedback, and a second between condition 3s 
convince-no feedback and condition 9s no feedback-no 
feedback. The results indicated that subjects in con­
dition 3s convinced-no feedback (mean = 21.41) felt they 
did significantly better (diff = 6.41, p< .05) on the 
task than did subjects in condition 6, not convinced-no 
feedback (mean = 15*00), and significantly better (diff = 
8.68, jo< .01) than subjects in condition 9, no feedback- 
no feedback (mean = 12.73).
Therefore, the main effects and individual comparisons 
of question 17 indicate that subjects who received true 
attitude feedback felt they had done a better job on the 
task than subjects who received either no feedback or not 
true attitude feedback. Similar results were observed 
in regards to convince feedback. Subjects who received 
convince feedback felt they had done a better job on the
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task than subjects who received either no feedback or not 
convinced feedback. It appears that positive feedback 
was more influential than negative feedback. Using the 
no feedback-no feedback condition as a baseline, positive 
feedback differed significantly from the baseline but 
negative feedback did not.
Attitudes towards the audience
Questions 15 and 16 concerned the subject’s perception 
of the alleged audience. The questions were 31 point bi­
polar scales, where a high score indicated a more positive 
disposition towards the audience.
For these questions a different MANOVA was calculated 
since in condition 9 there was no feedback from the 
audience. Thus, these subjects could not appropriately 
respond to the two audience questions. Since condition 
9 could not be included in the 3 x 3  analysis, factor A 
and factor B were combined into an overall C factor and 
a one-way analysis was calculated using 8 conditions.
The MANOVA using the Hotelling-Lawley Trace criteria 
indicated that there was a significant main effect (C),
F (14, 146) = 2.542, _p = .003. This indicates that the 
treatments had an overall effect on subject's attitude 
toward the audience.
The ANOVA (see Table 13) calculated on the separate 
questions indicated that only question 15, "if there was 
an audience involved in the study which you participated
Table 13 
Summary of Analysis of Variance 
Audience Related Questions
Questions













* * * *  £<.0001
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in, how did you feel about the audience," was significant, 
F (7, 80) = 5*812, £ = .0001, An orthogonal comparison 
of the combined positive conditions (condition 1, true 
attitude-convinced, condition convinced-no feedback 
and condition 7* true attitude-no feedback) vs. the 
combined negative conditions (condition 5* not true 
attitude-not convinced, condition 6, not convinced-no 
feedback and condition 8, not true attitude-no feedback) 
was significant, F (1, 80) = 39.^20, .01. This in­
dicates that overall, the positive feedback means (Table 
14) were greater than the negative feedback means. This 
indicates that when subjects received positive feedback 
they "liked" the audience more than when they received 
negative feedback.
Finally, a separate AN0YA calculated on question 7, 
"how do you feel towards the experimenter," produced no 
significant effects. This indicates that neither atti­
tudinal feedback, or convince feedback significantly 
influenced the subject's attitude about the experimenter.
Table 14 




















15- If there was an audience 
involved in the study you parti­
cipated in, how do you feel about 
the audience? Scales 31-like
very much to 1-dislike very much. 21.50 19.18 22.46 17*55
16. If you received information 
from an audience, how accurate do 
you think this information was?
Scales 31-very accurate to
1-very inaccurate. 25.59 24.14 24.35 21.64

























15. If there was an audience 
involved in the study you parti­
cipated in, how do you feel about 
the audience? Scales 31-like 
very much to 1-dislike very much.
16. If you received information 
from an audience, how accurate do 
you think this information was? 










In the present study volunteers chose to advocate a 
positive position about a relatively neutral topic. 
Following the attitudinal statements the volunteer received 
two types of feedback from an audience concerning his per­
formance . The speaker received feedback as to a) whether 
the audience was convinced, not convinced, or received 
no information concerning the convince factor, and 
b) whether the audience felt that what the speaker said 
represented his true attitude, or was not his true atti­
tude, or the speaker received no feedback as to the 
audience's perception of his true attitude. The experi­
ment investigated the relative effect of these two forms 
of consequences on the self-attribution of attitudes.
The effect of these treatments on the subject's percep­
tion of the task, audience and experimenter was also 
examined.
In the present study, it was important that subjects 
accurately perceive the information which they received.
If the feedback manipulation was not accurately perceived, 
the results could possibly be due to the subject's mis­
interpretation of the feedback. However, it was found 
that positive and negative forms of feedback had dif­
ferential effects on subject's perception of audience
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feedback. Subjects were also able to delineate between 
convince and attitudinal feedback. When subjects heard 
that the audience felt they were sincere, but were not 
convinced by the subject’s talk, the subjects were able 
to perceive that the audience felt that their talk was 
sincere. When they heard that they had convinced the 
audience, but the audience did not think the subject was 
sincere, then the subjects were still able to determine 
that the audience held a favorable attitude toward the 
product. Therefore, the manipulation checks appear to 
indicate that the results were not influenced by possible 
misinterpretations of the feedback by the subjects.
The present research was concerned with several 
major questions. First, results related to these ques­
tions will be discussed, along with their implications. 
Then results which had not been specifically predicted 
and their implications will be discussed. Finally, an 
overall summary and interpreation will be presented.
First of all, one of the primary factors which the 
present study investigated was the effect attitudinal 
feedback had on a speaker’s attitude toward the product. 
The first hypothesis predicted that when a speaker hears 
that the audience believes his statement to be his true 
attitude, he will have a more positive attitude toward 
the product than when he hears that the audience believes 
his statement was not his true attitude, or when he 
receives no feedback about his attitude. The results
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partially supported this prediction. True attitude feed­
back resulted in a more positive attitude than not true 
attitude feedback, but contrary to expectations, true 
attitude feedback did not differ from no feedback.
Compared to receiving no feedback positive attitudinal 
feedback did not significantly alter subject's attitude 
toward the product. Thus, it appears that the role theory 
conceptualization that another's perception of one's 
attitude is important information which influences 
attitudes was only partially supported.
The other feedback factor investigated in this study 
was whether or not convince feedback influenced the 
speaker's attitude. Specifically, the second hypothesis 
stated that when a speaker hears that he convinced an 
audience, he would adopt a more positive attitude about the 
product, than when he hears that the audience is not con­
vinced, or when he receives no feedback about the convince 
factor. The results indicated partial support for this 
hypothesis. Hearing that the audience was convinced 
resulted in the speaker adopting a more positive attitude 
about the product than when he hears that the audience 
was not convinced. However, contrary to expectations, 
attitudes of subjects who received convince feedback 
did not differ from the attitudes of subjects who did 
not receive any feedback. Although there was a signi­
ficant difference between convinced and not convinced
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feedback, there was no difference between convince feed­
back and no feedback.
The fact that the first two hypotheses received 
partial support seems to indicate that both attitudinal 
feedback and convince feedback influenced attitudes.
However, since positive feedback did not significantly 
differ from no feedback, it appears that negative feed­
back may have been more influential. As the above hypo­
theses were not directly concerned with negative forms of 
feedback, it might be appropriate to examine hypothesis 
five, which did compare negative feedback to no feedback.
Hypothesis five predicted that when a speaker receives 
no feedback about either factor, he would indicate a mode­
rate amount of attitude change. When he did not receive 
any feedback, a speaker will look at his own behavior 
for cues as his own behavior is the only source of infor­
mation regarding his attitude. The information that he 
chose to participate and to advocate a positive position 
will cause him to attribute a positive attitude about 
the product. The results supported this hypothesis.
It was found that individuals who received no feedback 
about either factor had a more positive attitude about 
the product than individuals who received either type of 
negative feedback, i.e. not convinced feedback, or not 
true attitude feedback.
The support for hypothesis five indicates that when 
subjects choose to do the task, and perceived responsibility
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for the outcome, the result was a fairly positive attitude 
toward the product. However, as the results of hypotheses 
one and two indicate, individuals who received no feedback 
about either factor had a similar attitude as individuals who 
received positive feedback. But, when they received 
negative feedback about their behavior, the result was 
a less positive attitude about the product. This finding 
seems to indicate that negative feedback had a greater 
impact than did positive feedback.
The following discussion of hypotheses three, four, 
six and seven will attempt to delineate the comparative 
effectiveness of the two types of feedback and indicate 
the underlying process or processes which may have 
occurred.
The third and fourth hypotheses were concerned with 
the relative effectiveness of the two types of feedback.
The third hypothesis predicted that when both types of 
feedback are positive, the speaker would have the most 
positive attitude. This hypothesis was not supported.
When both positive forms of feedback occurred, subjects 
did not demonstrate a more positive attitude than when 
they received only one form of positive feedback and no 
feedback about the other factor. When both forms of 
negative feedback occurred, subjects did not demonstrate 
a more negative attitude than when they received only 
one form of negative feedback and no feedback about the 
other factor. This indicated that the effect of the
bi
feedback was not additive, that combining two positive 
sources or two negative sources of feedback did not 
result in a more positive or negative attitude.
The fourth hypothesis attempted to compare the rela­
tive potency of the two types of feedback. Specifically, 
it was predicted that when a speaker receives conflicting 
information, direct information about the speaker's 
attitude would be more influential than information about 
the audience being convinced. Thus, it was expected that 
individuals who received true attitude-not convinced 
feedback would have a more positive attitude than indi­
viduals who received not true attitude-convinced feedback. 
However, contrary to expectations, a reverse relationship 
was found. Convince feedback was found to be more effect­
ive in influencing attitudes than attitudinal feedback.
As with the previous results, this finding fails to support 
the role theory conceptualization that other's perception 
of one's attitude is the primary information which deter­
mines attitudes. It appears that other processes are 
occurring in which convince feedback may play a primary 
role. The processes which account for this effect will 
be discussed later.
Another important question which was investigated 
was the possible inference process which individuals 
might be using to determine their attitudes. Previous 
studies conducted by Scott (1957. 1959) and Nels et al. 
(1969) have found that convince feedback can influence
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attitudes. It was postualted that the results of these 
previous studies might have been due to the fact that 
when a speaker finds that he convinced an audience, he 
infers that the audience perceives what he said as being 
representative of his real attitude. That is, the speaker 
makes an assumption that could be stated as "I convinced 
the audience, therefore they must have perceived me as 
being sincere and that I believed what I said. If they 
perceive this as my attitude, then it must be my attitude." 
Hypotheses six and seven were derived in order to examine 
if this inference process would occur.
Hypothesis seven predicted that similar attitudes 
would be demonstrated by subjects who receive either 
true attitude feedback or convince feedback. This was 
found to be true. Individuals who received either of 
these two forms of feedback demonstrated a similar 
attitude about the product. This indicated that posi­
tive forms of feedback, when considered alone, had 
approximately the same result. Hypothesis six predicted 
that when a speaker is informed that the audience was 
convinced, but receives no feedback about the audience’s 
perception of his attitude, he will demonstrate more 
attitude change than when he hears that the audience 
was convinced but did not perceive his statement to be 
his true attitude. This prediction was based on the 
role theory assumption that in order for attitude change 
to occur, a speaker must make an inference about his
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attitude based on the feedback of other’s perception of 
his attitude. When he hears that he convinced an audience 
but they did not perceive his statement to be his true 
attitude, then he cannot infer that he has a positive 
attitude about the topic and there should be little 
attitude change. The results did not support the above 
prediction. Subjects did not have a more positive atti­
tude when they only heard that they had convinced the 
audience but the audience did not perceive his statement 
to be his true attitude. Based on these results and the 
results of hypothesis four, it appears that the postulated 
inference process was not occurring. It seems that 
information contained in the convince feedback was more 
important. Thus, the inference model based on role 
theorists emphasis of attitudinal feedback was not 
supported.
The results of hypotheses one through seven have 
several implications and the following discussion will 
be concerned with these implications.
First of all, the fact that subjects who received 
no feedback about either factor had a fairly positive 
attitude seems to indicate support for Bern’s (1972) 
conceptualization of attitude change. When subjects 
are asked their attitude, they look for environmental 
cues in order to infer their attitude. In so doing, 
they look at the causal factors in the environment and 
at their own behavior. One important causal factor is
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the individuals perception of amount of choice he had to 
perform the behavior. An individual, in reviewing the 
forces which cause him to perform a behavior will assume 
that he would not volunteer for a task he dislikes, and 
would not speak in favor of a topic he does not like. 
Therefore, when an individual perceives his verbal be­
havior to be voluntary, he then concludes that he must 
have certain positive feelings about the topic which 
he advocated.
Thus, if a subject did not receive feedback from the 
audience, the available cues (i.e. perception of choice 
and overt verbal behavior) inform the subject that he 
has a positive attitude about the product. However, 
subjects who received feedback had additional cues upon 
which to base their perception of attitude. Subjects 
who received positive feedback did not indicate an 
appreciably different attitude than those who received 
no feedback, because, as found in hypothesis five, the 
effect of cues did not seem to be additive. That is, 
subjects who received no feedback had cues based on their 
own behavior from which they inferred a positive attitude 
about the product. Subjects who received positive feed­
back had additional cues, but these additional cues were 
simply consistent with the subject's attribution of his 
own attitude and was not seen as being important new 
information. Thus, the additional positive feedback 
did not result in a more positive attitude.
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However, subjects who received negative feedback had 
a considerable different set of cues to use in order to 
infer their attitude. Following the speech subjects had 
information that they had voluntarily made positive state­
ments. This information alone would produce a positive 
attitude. But then, individuals who received negative 
feedback received information which was not consistent 
with cues that they had voluntarily made positive state­
ments, The inconsistent information received from the 
audience resulted in a self-attribution of a less posi­
tive attitude about the product. Therefore, their 
attitude was less positive than subjects who received 
positive feedback or no feedback at all. When compared 
to receiving positive feedback, receiving negative feed­
back was utilized in the attribution process primarily 
because it was important new information about their 
behavior.
These results are supportive of Kelley's (1967) 
emphasis on negative consequences in an attribution 
interpretation of attitude change. Kelley believes that 
an individual assumes responsibility for negative con­
sequences, especially when he perceives having brought 
them about. In the present study subjects assumed 
responsibility for their behavior and the consequences, 
and therefore reacted to the informative impact of the 
feedback, with negative consequences having the greatest 
impact.
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An additional finding appropriate for discussion is 
that negative convince feedback was more influential than 
negative attitudinal feedback. The importance of the 
convince feedback had not been foreseen. If the postualted 
inference model based on role theory had been correct, 
attitudinal feedback should have been more influential. 
Since the results did not support the role theory con­
ceptualization, it must be concluded that attitudinal 
feedback is not the primary information which an individual 
uses to infer his attitude.
A relevant question then, is why was convince feed­
back more influential than attitudinal feedback? Several 
explanations are possible for these results, and these 
explanations will now be discussed.
One answer might be that convince feedback gave the 
speaker a clear indication that he either failed or 
succeeded on the assigned task, as defined by the experi­
menter's instructions. During the study, the experimenter 
informed the speaker that the idea of the task was to 
"try to inform, to get it across to the audience that 
this is a good product." Therefore, if the speaker hears 
that the audience is or is not convinced, then this feed­
back gives him a lucid indication that he succeeded or 
did not succeed on the task. In contrast, hearing what 
the audience perceives his attitude to be does not directly 
Inform him of how successful he was. Therefore, although 
both forms of feedback influenced attitudes, the demand
8?
characteristics inherent in the experiment may have 
produced a heavier "weighting" of the convince factor.
One explanation of the results might he then, that 
the experimenter's instructions indicated to the subject 
which factor is most important. Therefore, this factor 
was used by the subject to infer his own attitude about 
the product. However, if this process were actually 
happening then one would expect the convince feedback 
to be more influential throughout the dependent measures. 
But, the results indicate that on task related questions 
and on the choice question, attitudinal feedback was 
generally more influential. If the heavier "weighting" 
of the convince factor was experimentally induced, then 
it seems reasonable to assume that it would also be more 
influential on all the measures. Since this was not 
true, it appears that other processes may have caused 
the convince factor to be more influential.
Another possible explanation for the greater in­
fluence of convince feedback might be that the manipu­
lation of convince feedback was more potent than the 
manipulation of attitudinal feedback. These two forms 
of feedback can be conceptualized as two separate dimen­
sions, which extend from weak to very strong in potency.
It is possible that the attitudinal feedback used in the 
present study was not as strong on the attitudinal dimen­
sion as convince feedback was on the convince dimension. 
There is some support for this notion as negative convince
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feedback resulted in a significantly less positive attitude 
than when a subject received negative attitudinal feedback. 
However, there was no difference between the positive 
forms of each factor. In addition, it would seem logical 
to conclude that if the manipulation of convince feed­
back was more potent, then it should be more important 
over all of the dependent measures. But, as previously 
discussed, the results indicated that on several task 
questions and the choice question, attitudinal feedback 
was more influential. Based on these results, the 
argument that the manipulations may vary in potency is 
not very effective.
Another process which might provide an explanation 
concerns social reinforcement. It is possible that the 
observed differences between positive and negative feed­
back and between convince and attitudinal feedback could 
have resulted from the differentail reinforcement strength 
of the consequenes. That is, convince feedback had more 
reinforcing properties than did attitudinal feedback 
and positive feedback serves as a reinforcer and nega­
tive feedback does not.
The fact that convince feedback influenced attitude 
is consistent with previous research which has found 
that attitudes can be influenced by reinforcement received 
from an audience. Scott (195?) found that when subjects 
heard from an audience that they had won a debate and 
convinced the audience to accept the advocated position,
89
the subjects indicated positive attitude change toward 
the topic which they advocated. Scott felt his results 
indicated that positive convince feedback acted as a 
positive reinforcer which reinforced the subject's verbal 
behavior and the accompanying attitudes. Not convinced 
feedback served as a negative reinforcer which did not 
reinforce the verbal behavior and therefore, subjects 
did not show a change in their attitude. Scott (1959) 
also found that feedback from judges as to whether or not 
a speaker won a debate served as an effective reinforcer 
as winners indicated more attitude change. Winners also 
indicated more attitude change than controls who did not 
participate in the task. Finally, Dahlke (1967) was able 
to demonstrate that when a speaker heard that he had won 
or lost a debate, this information served as an effective 
reinforcer. However, Dahlke found that winners did not 
change their attitudes significantly more than control 
subjects who prepared and delivered their arguments, 
but did not receive any feedback. In Dahlke*s study, 
the reinforcement of winning had little effect, whereas 
losing appeared to cause attitude change.
The present investigation demonstrated results 
similar to Dahlke's (1967) study. Both studies have 
indicated a change in attitudes seems to have occurred 
without positive or negative feedback. In the present 
study, it was expected that a significant difference should 
occur between positive feedback and no feedback. The fact
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that this difference did not occur seems to indicate 
that subjects who received no feedback may have changed 
because of factors involved in making the speech. Attitude 
change which occurs without reinforcement obviously is 
not supportive of a reinforcement interpretation. That 
subjects who received no feedback had approximately the 
same attitude as subjects who received positive feedback 
seems to argue against the reinforcement notion that 
reinforcement has to occur for attitude change to take 
place.
One would also expect that when an individual receives 
two consistent forms of feedback, that this would be more 
reinforcing than just one form, and a more positive or 
negative attitude should be the result. Specifically, 
reinforcement theorists predict that the greater the 
magnitude of reinforcement that is administered, more 
attitude change should occur. In the present study 
combined positive or negative feedback did not result 
in greater change. This additional evidence argues 
against a reinforcement interpretation of the present 
results.
While it appears that convince feedback most likely 
has certain reinforcing properties, it seems that a simple 
reinforcement explanation of why convince feedback was 
more influential is inadequate. More involved and complex 
processes seem to be occurring as attitude change seems to 
be taking place which reinforcement theory cannot explain.
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Another explanation based on a more complex process is 
that subjects made a discrimination between the feedback 
based on its relevancy to the type of attribution they 
were being asked to make. It is possible that convince 
feedback was more influential because subjects were being 
asked to infer an attitude about an external object, i.e. 
the product. Thus, in looking for cues which they could 
use to infer their attitude, the behavior of the audience 
toward the same product could have been an important 
source of information, at least more important than 
attitudinal feedback. Subjects in this study seemed to 
be utilizing the audience's attitude about the object as 
a more relevant source of information than attitudinal 
feedback. In effect, attitudinal feedback provided 
subjects with information about the audience's perception 
of his attitude and behavior related to his attitude 
whereas convince feedback provided information directly 
about the external object. It seems then, that convince 
feedback was more effective because it contained more 
information about the external object than did attitudinal 
feedback. Thus, the audience's expressed attitude about 
the product was the most relevant source of information 
about the attribution they were asked to make.
These results concerning the subject's attitude toward 
the product seem to indicate that convince feedback was 
more influential than attitudinal feedback and that 
negative forms of feedback were more influential than
9^
positive forms. However, subjects seemed to respond to 
the task questions differently than they did to the 
product questions. The next section will be concerned 
with these apparent differences as indicated by the task 
questions.
On task related questions, subjects were asked to 
state how they felt about the task, how hard the task 
was, how much effort they put into the task, and how 
well they did. Responses to the task related questions 
indicated that when individuals were asked to evaluate 
aspects of their own behavior, they were, generally, 
more influenced by positive feedback and were more likely 
to use feedback of the audience's perception of their 
attitude as a basis for their evaluation about the task. 
Three of the four task questions indicated a significant 
attitudinal main effect but the convince feedback factor 
was significant only on question 17, how well did you do. 
Also, on question thirteen, only individuals who received 
true attitude feedback but no convince feedback indicated 
that the task was significantly easier. Question seven­
teen, "how well did you do on the task", indicated that 
attitudinal and convince feedback were roughly comparable 
in their influence. In general then, these findings 
are in direct opposition to results concerning the sub­
ject's attitude toward the product, where negative feedback 
and convince feedback was more influential.
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A possible explanation for the results on the task 
questions could be that attitudinal feedback was more 
closely related to the attribution the subject was being 
asked to make. In other words, the subject received 
feedback that the audience thinks what he said was his 
real attitude. In order to support this, the audience 
also stated that he was sincere, that he put a lot of 
effort into what he said, and that he really tried to 
put it across. Therefore, in talking about his perceived 
attitude, the audience also related information concerning 
his perceived behavior as related to his attitude. However, 
convince feedback only contains information about the 
audiences attitude towards the product. It appears 
that subjects relied more on attitudinal feedback to 
answer task questions because it was more informative 
or more closely related to their behavior than was 
feedback about whether or not the audience was convinced. 
Cues relating to perceived attitudes were being used 
to make attributions about behavior. Thus, subjects 
seemed to be able to differentiate between types of 
feedback and utilize information which provided more 
relevant data about the attribution they were being asked 
to make.
Results of the question about the subject's percep­
tion of choice provides additional support for the explana­
tion of why attitudinal feedback was more influential 
when subjects were asked about their perceptions of
9̂
various elements of the task. Results indicated that 
subjects who received negative attitudinal feedback 
perceived that they had less choice than those who re­
ceived positive attitudinal feedback. However, convince 
feedback did not significantly effect the subject's 
perception of choice. This differential perception 
of choice possibly occurred because, when faced with 
negative consequences caused by their own behavior, 
individuals may attempt to partially justify the outcome 
by decreasing the degree of their own responsibility. 
Presumably, this occurs because negative consequences 
may indicate that the individual made a bad decision 
when he decided to participate in the study. These 
results are similar to recent findings reported by Sogin 
and Pallak (1976). They found that individuals are 
reluctant to assume responsibility for negative conse­
quences. In the present study individuals, when faced 
with negative information about their perceived attitude, 
may have attempted to deny responsibility for the outcome 
by perceiving they had less choice. Again, these results 
are consistent with the task question results. When 
individuals are asked about their perception of their 
behavior, attitudinal feedback seems to be more influ­
ential. The possible reason for this is that the atti­
tudinal feedback contains more information about their 
behavior than does convince feedback. Therefore, subjects
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use attitudinal feedback in order to state their percep­
tion of their behavior as related to the task.
Another task question result was that generally, 
positive feedback was more influential than negative 
feedback, especially positive attitudinal feedback. This 
was not consistent with the results of the product related 
questions as the product related questions generally 
indicated that negative convince feedback was more 
influential.
One possible explanation of this result may be that 
following their presentation, individuals had a negative 
self-perception of how effective they had been. That is, 
they felt that they had done a poor job of convincing 
the audience. This notion is supported by low scores 
on the task performance question obtained for no feed­
back subjects and by the fact that their evaluation was 
not different from subjects who received negative feed­
back. Although the data does not indicate why subjects 
had such a negative self-perception of their behavior, 
observations made by the experimenter during the study 
may help. It was noticed during the study that many of 
the subjects were apprehensive about appearing on tele­
vision. During their presentation to the audience, it 
was not unusual for a subject to make minor errors, such 
as fumbling for the right word, not being able to say 
as much as he might want to, not maintaining eye contact 
with the camera, etc. Although these errors were of a
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minor nature, almost everyone felt quite relieved to be 
finished. Moreover, questions asked by the subjects 
immediately after their presentation indicated their 
concern about the minor errors in their presentation. 
Although after performing the task they may have had a 
positive attitude about the product, subjects felt they 
had done poorly on the task. When they received negative 
feedback, all this did was provide additional information 
which they were already aware of. Since the feedback 
was consistent with their self-perception of their behavior, 
and the cues were not additive, subjects who received 
additional negative feedback did not indicate a different 
perception of the task than did subjects who received 
no feedback. However, when they received positive feed­
back, this provided important new information which could 
be utilized in the attribution process. Following the 
completion of the task, the individuals had information 
which informed them of how they did. This information 
alone would produce a negative evaluation. But then, 
individuals received positive feedback which was incon­
sistent with their perceived behavior. The inconsistent 
information received from the audience resulted in a 
more positive self-attribution of how well they did.
When compared to receiving negative feedback, receiving 
positive feedback was utilized in the attribution process 
because it was important new information about the 
individual's behavior.
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The present study demonstrates that consequences can 
and do play a role in self-attribution. Individuals 
were given a choice to participate in a study where they 
could expect consequences to occur. Once an individual 
agreed to participate, he assumed responsibility for the 
possible consequences. And, as the results indicate, 
the consequences of his behavior affected his attitude 
about the product and his perception of the task. Attri­
bution theory suggests that following an attitudinal 
behavior, an individual typically uses information about 
this behavior and surrounding cues to infer his attitude. 
That is, based on his perception of his behavior and the 
controlling environmental factors, an individual makes 
certain attributions about his internal state, motivation, 
attitudes and behavior. Generally, the results of this 
study are consistent with attribution theory. However, 
some of the results suggest theoretical modifications in 
the role of consequences in the self-attribution of 
attitudes.
These modifications are based on the interaction 
of type of consequences and initial attributions. When 
an individual is faced with consequences which provide 
information about his behavior, whether or not an indi­
vidual will use this information seems to be based on 
several considerations. If the feedback is consistent 
with previous cues, then it is less Informative and less 
likely to have an influence. However, If the feedback
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is inconsistent with previous cues, and therefore represents 
new information, then the feedback will play a major role 
when an individual states his attitude or perception.
For example, if an individual perceives that he has done 
a poor job, then receiving information that he did a 
poor job will not affect his perception. However, if 
consequences inform him that he did a good job, this is 
important new information which provides him with a new 
and different set of cues to utilize when he is asked 
to state how well he believes he did on the task.
Also, the cues which an individual uses are apparently 
those which provide the most relevant feedback. In other 
words, there is a certain consistency between the attri­
bution a person makes and the relevant cues which he 
will use to make an attribution. Individuals seem to 
be able to delineate the relevant cues which will provide 
them with the most information about the attribution they 
are asked to make. For example, an individual upon being 
asked to infer what his attitude is, will use the informa­
tion which is most useful to making that attribution.
In the present study, when asked to infer an attitude 
about the product, subjects used information about the 
audience's attitude toward the product. When the subject 
was asked about his perception of behavior related to 
the task, then he used attitudinal feedback, which in­
formed him of the audience's perception of his behavior.
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Consistency processes have often been discussed in 
attitude theories and attribution theory has not been an 
exception. Kelley (196?) has suggested that individuals 
infer attitudes consistent with the joint implications 
of the initial decision and negative consequences fol­
lowing an internal attribution of consequences. The 
present study indicates the presence of a consistency 
between type of consequences and the type of internal 
attribution which individuals are asked to make. The 
cues in the environment which are used are those which 
provide the most relevant information. That is, if an 
individual is asked to evaluate his own behavior, he 
will use cues which inform him of his behavior. If he 
is asked about his feelings toward an external object, 
he will use cues which provide information about the 
object.
Therefore, it seems that there are two important 
factors which determine whether or not consequences will 
influence an Individuals self-attribution of his attitude. 
First of all, the individuals initial perception of cues 
related to his behavior or attitude is important. These 
cues are environmental and internal factors which indicate 
to an individual what his attitude is. For instance, 
perception of choice, and perceptions of various aspects 
of behavior would be a series of cues which an individual 
might use to make a self-attribution of attitude. A 
series of negative cues seems to imply that positive
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consequences will "be more influential,, and a series of 
positive cues seems to indicate that negative consequences 
will be more influential. Feedback which is consistent 
with existing cues is not as influential as feedback 
which is inconsistent with existing cues. Also, the 
type of feedback which will be utilized by the individual 
seems to be dependent upon the utilitarian value of the 
information contained in the consequences. If the type 
of feedback is relevant to the self-attribution the 
individual is being asked to make, then that type of 
feedback is likely to be utilized. If the feedback is 
not relevant to the type of attribution an individual 
is being asked to make, then this information will not 
be influential.
If these conceptualizations are correct, then further 
studies should explore these factors. The importance 
of relevant feedback could be examined by comparing various 
forms of relevant feedback with irrelevant feedback. 
Additionally, the influence of initial cues related to 
his behavior could be examined in a situation where an 
individual perceives responsibility for his behavior, 
then either does poorly, or performs well, and then he 
receives varying degrees of positive and negative con­
sequences .
Based on the data from the present study that indi­
cates consequences can influence the self-attribution 
of attitudes, it would seem important to further explore
101
the apparent interaction between the initial cues relating 
to an individuals behavior and the effect of various 
types of consequences.
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Table 15 









Feedback (A) 2 532.229 20.907**** 4-25.866 27.678****
Attitude
Feedback (B) 2 157.253 6.177** 20.987 1.364
A x B 4 57.025 2.240 84.510 5,493***
Within-cell
error 90 25.4.58 15.386
* . 05
* *  £<.01 
*** £<.. 001






Source df MS F MS F
Convince
Feedback (A) 2 396. *13*1 31.592**** 810.23*1 25.388****
Attitude
Feedback (B) 2 6.366 .505 107.3*11 3.363*
A x B *1 2/1.396 1.9^ 33.053 I.O36
Within-cell
error 90 12.5/48 31.91^
* £<-05 
* *  2< -01 
* * *  £ < . 0 0 1 
**** £ <  .0001 108
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Table 16












9 26. 64 26.09 22.00
Convinced 10 29.05 30.09 26.55
11 28.00 28.96 27.59
12 29. 41 28.55 25.32
9 I8.96 16.73 15.46Not
Convinced 10 21.09 21.96 21.46
11 22.23 21.59 20.09
12 19.00 20.14 15.82
9 26.27 18.50 22.41N o 
Feedback 10 28.59 21.91 28.05
11 26.23 23.41 26.82
12 28.41 23.64 24. 91
Note. Question 9= How do you feel about the product which 
you advocated? Scales 31-like very much to 1-dislike very 
much.
Question 10s How useful do you feel the product would be?
Scales 31-very useful to 1-very useless.
Question 11s How valuable as an aid around the home do
you feel this product is? Scales 31-very valuable to
1-very worthless.
Question 12s Do you think that sometime in the future you 




Analysis of Variance of Question 7 
Like or Dislike of Experimenter
Source df MS F
Convince Feedback (A) 











This study is interested in finding out the persuasive 
effects different forms of communication have. For this 
aspect of the study, you should talk in favor of the 
product. The general idea is to convince the audience 
that this is a good product, so don't he hesitant to state 
or emphasize whatever you want to say.
PRODUCTS SUPERSTRONG STRAPPING TAPE
Make your talk about 3 minutes long, which is about 
2 to 1 page, written. Or, if you wish, just form an out­
line and make up your talk as you go along. At the end 
of your talk the experimenter will ask you several short 
questions.
The following are a few points which you may want 
to mention. Use these points in your talk, or add your 
own. So say what you want and emphasize what you want.
Feel free to write on this paper.
Important Pointss
- Similar to scotch tape but much stronger.
- Has fiberglass strands throughout, which increases its
strength.
- Not much more expensive than regular tape...590 for 10
yards.
- Makes old kinds of tape obsolete.
- Has a 150 lb. breaking point, meaning that 150 pounds
of pressure has to be applied before it will break.
- Serves several different functions. For instance, it
can reinforce, repair and serve as heavy-duty binding 
for books.
- Can be used to hold bulky objects together, such as
hoses or strands of wire.
- Can be used to strengthen cracked windows.
- In many instances, especially in emergencies, it can 
be used in place of twine or small rope.
113
- Can repair rubber products.
- Can repair handles on tools.
- Can be used to wrap heavy packages... adds strength to
boxes.
- Can be used in place of clamps when glueing objects
together.
- Lasts much longer than ordinary tape.
- I s  highly resistant to heat and cold.
VITA
William Thomas Shannon was horn in Redlands, 
California on November 18, 19^5• He graduated from Hiram 
Johnson High School in Sacramento, California in 1963.
He then attended Sacramento State College and received 
his Bachelor of Arts degree in 1968. In September,
1968 he enrolled in the Graduate School at Sacramento 
State College and received his Master of Arts degree in 
January, 1971. He then enrolled in Graduate School at 
Louisiana State University in the Department of Psychology. 
He is a candidate for the Doctor of Philosophy degree 
at the summer commencement.
114
E X A M I N A T I O N  A N D  THESIS R E P O R T
Candidate: William Thomas Shannon 
Major Field: Psychology
T itle  oi Thesis: Two Types of Consequences and their Influence on the Self-Attribution of Attitudes
Approved:
ijor Professor and Chairman
Dean of the Grdouate School
EXAM INING CO M M ITTEE:
Jy.
Date of Examination: 
May 7, 1976
